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THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A 
NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 281/JANUARY 2008 
NATHALIE TOCCI 
WITH CASE STUDIES BY HAKIM DARBOUCHE, MICHAEL 
EMERSON, SANDRA FERNANDES, RUTH HANAU-SANTINI, 
GERGANA NOUTCHEVA AND CLARA PORTELA* 
1. Introduction 
Since its inception, the European Union has been conceptualised (and prided itself) as being a 
distinctly ‘different’ type of international actor. Over the decades, it has been described as a 
‘civilian’ (Dûchene, 1973, p. 19), a ‘soft’ (Hill, 1990) and most recently a ‘normative’ power in 
international relations (Manners, 2002, 2006). The EU’s official texts make similar claims about 
the Union’s role in world politics. Since the 1970s, in fact, norms and values began distinctly to 
permeate European foreign policy documents and declarations (see Hill & Smith, 2000). At a 
two-day meeting of EU heads of state on 14-15 December 1973, which resulted in a declaration 
on Europe's identity, the delegates talked about building a ‘just basis’ for international relations. 
The 1986 Single European Act called upon the Community to “display the principles of 
democracy and compliance with the rule of law and with human rights” in its conduct of 
external relations. The 1988 Rhodes European Council called for an EU role in preserving 
international peace, promoting the solution to regional conflicts, demonstrating solidarity for 
democracy, supporting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, strengthening the 
effectiveness of the United Nations and improving social and economic conditions in less 
developed countries. The Maastricht Treaty went further, calling for the preservation of peace 
and security, the promotion of international cooperation, the fight against international crime, 
the development of democracy and the rule of law, the respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the support for economic and social development (Article J.1). Most 
explicitly, the Reform Treaty states that in international affairs the EU would be guided by and 
would seek to promote the values on which the Union is founded, including democracy, human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Article III-193(1), Article I-2 and I-3).1  
This chapter seeks to test these assertions. Rather than assuming that the EU is a normative 
international player simply by virtue of its ‘different’ non-state nature, we show that in different 
geographical regions and at different points in time, the Union’s foreign policies have taken on 
dramatically different forms. If by a normative foreign policy we mean pursuing normative 
                                                     
* Nathalie Tocci is CEPS Research Fellow and Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome. 
Hakim Darbouche is PhD candidate, University of Liverpool. Michael Emerson is CEPS Senior Fellow. 
Sandra Fernandes is Visiting Fellow, CEPS; lecturer at the University of Minho (Portugal) and PhD 
candidate at Sciences Po (Paris). Ruth Hanau-Santini is Research Fellow, University of Bologna. Gergana 
Noutcheva is CEPS Research Fellow and Lecturer, University of Maastricht. Clara Portela is a PhD 
candidate, European University Institute. The authors would like to thank Bodhana Dimitrovova and Ian 
Manners as well as all the participants at the CEPS workshop on “Who is Normative? The EU and its 
Global Partners”, 19-20 October 2007. 
1 As numbered in the draft Constitutional Treaty. 
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goals through normatively deployed instruments and having a discernible normative impact, 
then what emerges, perhaps inevitably, is that the EU is not always a normative international 
actor. Through the analysis of eight case studies, this chapter examines how EU foreign policy 
has at times been normative, while at other times it has been realist, imperialistic and status quo-
oriented. In a final section we tease out the principal dynamics at work in determining why the 
EU acts the way it does in different cases and draw some lessons concerning the nature of the 
EU’s role in the world.  
We reproduce below the table developed in Tocci (2007), showing the eight case studies of EU 
foreign policy selected for analysis in this paper. 
Table 1. The EU’s role in the world: Selected sub-case studies 
Normative Realpolitik Imperialistic Status Quo Type of 
actor 





       
Means 
 
        
Results 
 























2. Enlargement Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, 1989-2007: 
Normative Intended 
Contributed by Gergana Noutcheva 
2.1 Normative goals 
The normative objectives of democratisation and economic modernisation, achieved by 
anchoring the post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the Western model 
of political pluralism and economic liberalism, have been the cornerstones of the EU’s 
enlargement policy in the 1990s. The EU’s response to the collapse of communism in Eastern 
Europe in 1989 was to extend the prospect of membership to the countries in the region, in an 
attempt to steer their domestic transformation and return to the European mainstream. The EU’s 
offer of membership was made conditional on these countries’ achievement of high standards of 
domestic governance and the normalisation of their relations with their neighbours. The 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ embodied the EU’s vision of the necessary political and economic 
trajectory to emerge from the deep economic, political and social crises that resulted from the 
region’s abrupt change of regime.  
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In essence, the accession requirements of democracy, market economy and legal harmonisation 
with the EU can be seen as an invitation to take on board the EU’s political, economic and legal 
acquis before being admitted to take part in EU power-sharing mechanisms. Although 
especially designed to evaluate the readiness of the CEE candidates to join the EU, the 
Copenhagen criteria are deeply rooted in the EU’s own legal traditions and common policy 
practices. Art. 6 of the Treaty on the European Union codifies the EU’s democracy, human 
rights and rule of law principles as constitutive elements of the EU’s political community. The 
joint governance of the EU’s economic space through common policies and institutions has a 
firm legal basis in the EU’s treaties too. What the EU asked the candidates to comply with prior 
to accession is in principle applicable to EU member states too. The design and implementation 
of the enlargement policy by EU institutions can be viewed as an expression of the Union’s own 
identity.    
2.2 Normative means  
To understand the normative dimension of the EU’s enlargement policy, one needs to keep in 
mind the voluntary nature of the process, attributing normative qualities also to the policy 
means employed by the Union. In the early 1990s, it was the Eastern European countries that 
demanded integration into EU structures, not least as protection against the former imperial 
power – the Soviet Union. The EU was reacting to external events and developing an 
enlargement strategy in parallel to its internal agenda.  
The major instrument for pursuing the EU’s normative goals in the enlargement context was the 
conditionality principle of ‘carrots and sticks’ (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004). 
Accession conditionality as practiced by the EU has not involved the active punishment of EU 
candidates that fell short of reform expectations. Instead, the EU withheld benefits from the 
accession hopefuls by delaying their progress on the way to membership. It also played up 
symbolic politics by allowing good performers to advance in the process while highlighting lost 
opportunities to the laggards. Academics have described this conduct as ‘reinforcement by 
reward’ (Schimmelfennig, Engert & Knobel, 2006) or ‘gate-keeping’ (Grabbe, 2003). In 
principle, the EU was more inclined to encourage and reward performance than to sanction 
underperformance, except indirectly. This is not to disregard the power asymmetry between the 
EU and the candidate countries. The EU was the one to decide on each candidate’s suitability to 
become a member of the club by setting the accession criteria and evaluating the preparedness 
of the applicants. Whereas in theory the candidates formally negotiated accession, in practice 
very little negotiation took place. The acquis was non-negotiable, with the exception of some 
transition periods and temporary derogations. And the EU alone could decide whether and how 
a candidate fulfilled the criteria for membership. 
Yet what empowered the Commission to demand compliance with its accession requirements 
were especially its references to political values and economic norms. The Commission 
progressively felt comfortable to criticise and ‘shame’ the candidates’ shortcomings by publicly 
announcing policy recommendations, mobilising further reform constituencies within these 
countries and galvanising other international actors with stakes in the reform process, e.g. 
international organisations, donors and international business (Grabbe, 2001). By acting in 
pursuit of its normative goals, the EU demanded conformity with its values of candidates 
wishing to become equal partners in the European project.  
In addition, conditionality was accompanied by softer mechanisms of policy transfer in various 
sectors based on social interaction and contacts between the EU institutional machinery and the 
national administrations and political bodies of the candidate countries. In the first half of 
1990s, the EU signed Association Agreements (known as Europe Agreements) with the CEE 
applicants which not only liberalised trade exchanges but also institutionalised the political 
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relations between the EU and the respective national authorities. The Accession Partnerships 
initiated in the late 1990s provided a further forum for dense institutional contacts between the 
EU and the candidates’ public bodies, detailing reform priorities and monitoring mechanisms. 
The annual monitoring reports of the European Commission, which evaluated progress towards 
accession of each candidate, offered another opportunity for information exchange between 
Brussels and the national capitals. In short, the active socialisation of the applicants into the 
‘European way of doing things’ complemented the more forceful incentive-based method of 
conditionality, although the latter was by far given more credit for the results achieved in the 
short period of accession preparations.  
2.3 Normative results 
The eastern enlargement in two successive rounds in 2004 and 2007 has widely been 
acknowledged as the EU’s biggest foreign policy successes to date. This is due to the pace and 
depth of the political and economic transformation that enlargement engendered in Central and 
Eastern Europe between 1989 and 2004-07. On the whole, in just over one decade, the East 
European countries established the institutional foundations of modern states and transformed 
themselves from being full-blown dictatorships into liberal democracies with vibrant pluralism 
and engaged civil societies (Vachudova, 2005). They also went through deep economic change 
cutting down on the losses of the centrally planned system and establishing the fundamentals of 
modern market economies, attracting billions of euros of foreign direct investment (FDI) every 
year and growing at high rates (Gros & Steinherr, 2002).  
This is not to say that everything went smoothly and every country achieved the same results. 
Some countries took longer than others to embark on a consistent reform track. Some had more 
favourable starting conditions than others and progressed faster. Some went through setbacks 
and had to struggle harder to overcome domestic resistance to change. But the overall record is 
highly positive. Critics may still question the quality of domestic governance in the new 
member states compared to the older ones. A governance quality gap between Western and 
Eastern Europe still exists. But given their point of departure in the early 1990s, the Central and 
Eastern European countries have gone a long way towards becoming credible partners in the 
European integration project.  
2.4 Conditioning factors  
What explains the EU’s normative behaviour in the enlargement context? The answer to this 
question is complex, but the key to understanding these normative results is the combined effect 
of external and external dynamics which converged to produce the observed outcome.  
Internal interests 
Above all, the EU’s internal political context became increasingly favourable towards 
enlargement. Enlargement-sceptics were progressively silenced over the course of the 1990s and 
an overall sense of priority emerged around the enlargement agenda. Points of difference 
between the member states existed but related more to questions of how and when to enlarge 
rather than to whether and why. This internal consensus was critical for finding solutions to the 
many problems and difficulties along the process. Did rational interest-based motives underlie 
the ‘normative’ appearance of the EU’s enlargement discourse? For some scholars, the EU had 
good geo-political and economic reasons to support the transition process in Eastern Europe and 
attempt to influence developments there to its advantage (Vachudova, 2005). For others, the EU 
had no real interest in proposing full institutional inclusion to the Eastern European states and in 
accepting their leaders as equal partners in EU decision-making structures (Schimmelfennig, 
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2001). An advanced association with the EU might have served the geostrategic objective of 
anchoring these countries to the West both in political and economic terms. What could explain 
the EU’s generous offer of membership is the feeling of kinship and moral duty to the East 
Europeans who were cut off from the European integration project as a result of unfortunate 
geo-politics in the aftermath of the Second World War (Sjursen, 2002). Official EU documents 
and speeches indeed often invoke the widespread sentiment among EU policy-makers that this 
was ‘an historic opportunity’ to reunite the continent and do away with ideological divisions 
and artificial barriers. Yet regardless of whether interests also dictated or influenced EU actions, 
this does not belittle the predominance of normative goals in the Eastern enlargement policy.  
Internal capacity 
Beyond the convergence on normative priorities, the EU initially did not know how to support 
the transition process from communism to democracy and a market economy, nor did anyone 
else. There was no grand plan to achieve the desired objectives apart from the promise of EU 
membership, and the EU’s enlargement policy was in many respects improvised and reactive to 
developments on the ground. The Commission was entrusted by the member states to oversee 
the enlargement dossier which it took very seriously, not least because this was an opportunity 
to raise its institutional profile in the foreign policy domain. Subsequently, the Commission 
mobilised its internal resources and worked devotedly to build the necessary internal capacity to 
see this process through to a successful end. The Union put at work the policy instruments it 
knew how to use best – those linked to integration – rather than foreign policy capabilities, 
which it was known to lack.   
External environment 
Finally, the external environment was conducive to the EU’s overall normative role in Central 
and Eastern Europe in the post-communist period. The geo-political change triggered by the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union challenged the ideological division 
that had marked Europe’s post-war history. It also triggered a realignment of geo-strategic 
orientations and foreign policy priorities in Eastern Europe. Not only was the West ready to 
offer financial support and security guarantees, but also the East Europeans were willing to 
integrate in the Euro-Atlantic structures as an expression of their normalisation and ‘return to 
Europe’. The US firmly supported the anchorage of the region in Western institutional 
frameworks and contributed to the democratisation and economic modernisation of these 
countries. In this sense, a favourable constellation of external and internal factors existed and 
prepared the ground for the EU’s normative role.  
3. Sanctions against Belarus: Normative Unintended 
Contributed by Clara Portela 
3.1 Normative goals 
The goals pursued by the EU vis-à-vis Belarus through its sanctions policies are unequivocally 
normative. The EU refers to the ‘violations of international electoral standards’ in the 2006 
presidential elections and the ‘crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition’ as the 
primary reasons for the imposition of sanctions. The EU sanctions strategy against Belarus has 
followed an incrementalist logic, unfolding in parallel to the evolution of the Belarusian state 
towards authoritarianism. 
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The EU’s goals have also been consistent over time: Belarus represents a clear case for 
sanctions tailored to the advancement of democracy. The origins of the current sanctions regime 
can be traced back to the EU’s reaction to the Belarusian constitutional crisis of 1996: 
restrictions on the freedom of demonstration and the freedom of speech, followed by the 
enactment of a new constitution concentrating powers in the president’s hands were met by a 
first wave of negative EU measures: the Council decided, among others, to limit political 
contacts with the Belarusian authorities, and froze negotiations on a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement and on a new TACIS aid programme. For its part, the European 
Parliament announced its intention to withdraw assent to any bilateral agreement with Belarus. 
Subsequently, every step towards greater authoritarianism was met by a tightening of EU 
sanctions. On top of successive flawed elections, the disappearance of four Belarusian citizens 
triggered a separate sanctions regime. EU sanctions now encompass a visa ban and freezing of 
assets on individuals connected with the violations of international electoral standards, the 
repression of peaceful demonstrators and the obstruction of justice.   
Beside CFSP sanctions, the EU has also suspended the application of trade privileges, the 
generalised system of preferences (GSP), due to the lack of freedom of trade unions. Finally, the 
European Commission (2006) has declared in a non-paper that it expects Belarus to guarantee 
the rights of entrepreneurs to “operate without excessive intervention by the authorities”. In 
sum, all EU institutions – the Council, Parliament and the Commission – converge in their 
condemnation of the Belarusian regime, although the focus on pro-democratic reforms and the 
strengthening of the rule of law has recently been supplemented by requirements pertaining to 
free-market liberties. 
The legitimacy of EU goals is enhanced by the fact that its sanctions were imposed in support of 
claims made by pan-European organisations. The disappearance of the four public figures had 
been the subject of an April 2004 report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (the ‘Pourgourides Report’) demanding an independent enquiry. Elections were deemed 
to be flawed because they failed to meet OSCE standards. Accordingly, the EU has pledged to 
review its position “in the light of reforms made to the Electoral Code to bring it into line with 
OSCE commitments” and “actions by the authorities to respect human rights with regard to 
peaceful demonstrations”, such as the “release and re-habilitation of political detainees”. 
Concerning the disappearance of the four citizens, the EU announced that it would take into 
account the willingness of the authorities to conduct a full and transparent investigation and to 
bring those responsible to justice. Finally, the minimum standards for the freedom of trade 
unions, which Belarus fails to respect, are set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).   
3.2 Normative means 
The means applied by the Union in pursuit of these predominantly democratic standards are also 
normative, i.e. they can be located within the confines of the law. This is due to the fact that the 
measures wielded against Belarus consist in the withdrawal of unilaterally granted benefits. In 
other words, the EU is simply refraining from providing benefits that it is free to withhold. No 
international actor is obliged to provide technical assistance to another state, grant visas to third 
country nationals or offer preferential trade conditions unless it is committed to do so by treaty. 
In the case of the EU, granting of preferential trade is governed by an EC Regulation stipulating 
the conditions under which preferential treatment can be granted. The suspension is foreseen 
only after the time-consuming and meticulous investigation of a third state’s non-compliance 
with internationally agreed ILO standards. 
The EU follows a declared double-track approach, drawing a distinction between those 
responsible for the violation of electoral standards and human rights, and the Belarusian 
population at large. Its asset freeze and visa ban target the responsible individuals whose names 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 7 
appear in public blacklists, thereby earmarking them “persona non grata” (Pomorska, 2006). By 
contrast, the EU maintains contacts with mid-range officials. At the same time, the EU has 
consistently made clear that it would “avoid sanctions which harm the wider population” 
(Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). Indeed, it claims to support the ‘needs of the population’ through 
social and economic development. No trade restrictions have ever been imposed, and the EU 
continues to provide assistance which directly benefits the population though NGOs. In 
response to the original crisis in 1996, the EU pledged to examine ways of associating civil 
society with the democratisation process. The EU supports democratisation, for example, 
through the funding of independent TV and radio programmes.  
3.3 Non-normative results 
The increasing assertiveness in the EU’s responses to the deterioration of the state of democracy 
in Belarus has not fulfilled its normative intent. In the early phases of Lukaschenko’s rule, EU-
inspired sanctions solved a dispute over the ill-treatment of Western diplomats (the Drozdy 
crisis) and reversed the closure of the OSCE mission in Minsk (Toledano, 2001). However, EU 
sanctions have not promoted wider democratic practices. Equally, and in spite of the EU’s 
dedicated effort to send a positive message of support to the Belarusian people, democratic 
forces in the country have not been substantially strengthened as a result of EU pressure. It is 
generally assumed among Western observers that if free elections were held under present 
circumstances, President Lukaschenko would still win a majority (Grant & Leonard, 2006). 
3.4 Conditioning factors  
In comparison to traditional coercive policies, such as blanket trade embargoes, the EU displays 
a sophisticated strategy respecting the division between the individuals it aims to condemn, and 
the wider population it intends to support. How can the failure of the double-track strategy be 
accounted for? Why has the EU failed to compel change in the behaviour of the leadership, or in 
substantially strengthening Belarusian democratic forces?  
The internal political context 
The internal political context is key to understanding the normative framing of the sanctions 
against Belarus. The European Parliament and a number of national parliaments have been 
vocal supporters of the sanctions, as well as the initiators of the positive measures that are 
adopted in parallel. The preoccupation for sparing the population typically accompanies EP 
demands for negative measures. Particular interest groups and civil society organisations have 
played a central role in the suspension of the GSP. According to the EC Regulation on GSP, 
investigations on non-compliance leading to suspension can only be initiated at the request of 
affected groups. In this case, it was the initiative of international trade unions that set the 
process in motion. The decision to suspend was taken reportedly against the will of Belarus 
neighbours Lithuania and Poland, which saw the interest of their cross-border enterprises 
negatively affected. But by and large the internal political consensus crystallised in favour of 
sanctions.   
This is largely because little contradiction exists in this case between so-called ‘possession 
goals’ and ‘milieu goals’, discussed in detail in CEPS Working Document No. 279.2 Sanctions 
have not imperilled possession goals, such as the pursuit of commercial and energy interests. 
CFSP sanctions do not affect trade – commercial exchanges between the EU and Belarus have 
                                                     
2 See also Wolfers (1962). 
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continued. According to 2006 statistics, Belarus is only the 47th trading partner of the EU, and 
its planned economic system makes it unattractive for further investment. Virtually deprived of 
raw materials, Belarus is only relevant as a transit country for Russian energy supplies. When 
bilateral cooperation has become pressing, it has taken place in spite of the sanctions. Sanctions 
have not prevented holding discussions on energy matters between the Commission and 
Belarusian mid-rank officials in the aftermath of the crisis with Russia in January 2007. Given 
that possession goals (trade and energy security) do not collide with milieu goals (pro-
democracy sanctions), there is no internal constituency within the EU that is fundamentally 
opposed to the sanctions.  
Internal capability 
In theory, the EU is well-placed to coerce Belarus through economic means. In relational terms, 
Belarus is dependent on trade with the EU, while Belarus is a negligible market for the EU as a 
whole. The EU is Belarus’ second trading partner, and its first export partner, absorbing over 
45% of its exports. By contrast, Belarus accounts for a mere 0.3% of the EU’s total trade 
volume. Thus, trade restrictions could greatly harm Belarus without causing much damage to 
the EU’s economy. The limitation on the EU’s side is rather its unwillingness to incur any 
tangible cost for the sake of Belarus’ reorientation towards democratic rule. Firstly, a possible 
retaliation by Belarus consisting in stopping the supply of Russian energy and oil would entail 
serious costs to the EU and compete with the goal of ensuring energy security. Secondly, there 
is virtually no constituency inside the EU that would support forceful means, while Lithuania 
and Poland, as well as the wider business communities, would strongly oppose it.      
The external environment  
Beyond the unwillingness to incur high costs, the main reason explaining the EU’s failure to 
engender normative results in Belarus is located within the country’s domestic dynamics. As 
typically the case with many countries under sanctions, the leadership has been able to capitalise 
on Western condemnation to its advantage. It portrays the country as being ‘demonised’ and 
‘under siege’. This perception is partly aided by the fact that the country has been subject to 
sanctions of diverse nature (most recently the suspension of GSP). This is unsurprising in a 
country where free media and civil liberties are severely constrained. Public diplomacy aside, 
other circumstances weigh heavily in the attitude of Belarusian citizens. In economic terms, 
Belarus was better off than its southern neighbours Ukraine and Moldova when the Soviet 
Union collapsed and this despite the scarcity of raw materials (Beichelt, 2007). This difference 
persists today, despite these countries’ Euro-Atlantic choice. The comparatively high living 
standards in Belarus, coupled with an unusually positive image of Russia as a protector, have all 
aided the popular perception of Lukaschenko as both the guarantor of close ties with Russia and 
of Belarusian wealth (Zurawski, 2005).  
The domestic configuration of Belarusian politics is closely linked to the role of Russia as a 
‘protecting power’. Russian support has been critical to the resilience of the Lukaschenko 
regime. In economic terms, Russia has supplied Belarus with subsidised energy. In political 
terms, the close ties with Russia have allowed Belarus to present itself as displaying an ‘Eastern 
orientation’, rather than being internationally isolated (Zurawski, 2005). However, the 
relationship between the two countries has come under considerable strain in recent years, 
suggesting that Russia no longer offers unconditional support to its Western neighbour. 
Interruptions of Russian gas supplies, provoked by the Belarusian rejection of increases in 
energy prices, have taken place consecutively in 2006 and 2007. The 2007 energy crisis 
prompted Belarus to establish ‘structured discussions’ on energy issues with the EU – a 
cooperation framework at expert level falling short of a fully fledged ‘energy dialogue’. These 
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developments suggest that a weakening support of Russia might open the space for increased 
EU leverage on Minsk.  
The influence of other international actors also plays an important albeit secondary role. The EU 
finds itself between two powers whose influences and positions largely cancel each other out. 
When imposing sanctions against Belarus, the EU has acted in concert with the US. 
Transatlantic cooperation is habitual in sanctions policies, and in this case it is unknown which 
side took the initiative. Given that Belarus is in a state union with Russia, such move was seen 
as a step aimed at challenging Russia’s sphere of influence. However, given that neither the US 
nor Russia considers Belarus a priority, and that the nature of sanctions have not seriously 
affected Belarus’ economy, the sanctions were bound to remain rather uncontroversial in the 
wider international context. 
4. EU Policies towards Russia, 1999-2007: Realpolitik Intended  
Contributed by Sandra Fernandes 
4.1 Non-normative goals 
EU declarations on Russia are rife with normative intent, but revealed preferences suggest these 
have been trumped by other goals, notably related to energy security and the penetration of 
Russian markets goals. Yet unlike the cases of Eastern Europe and Belarus, the pursuit of these 
goals vis-à-vis Russia has contradicted the EU’s normative agenda. In 2003, the Wider Europe 
initiative and the European Security Strategy clarified that the EU aimed to create prosperity 
and security on its borders and highlighted the importance of its relations with Russia. In 
particular, the EU repeatedly stated its intention to promote, in its institutionalised dialogue with 
Russia, the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority 
rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, the principles of market economy and 
sustainable development. The spirit of the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(Emerson et al., 2006b, pp. 62-94) also included the goal of promoting international security, in 
equality and partnership. The goals stated by the EU advocate an international order based on 
‘effective multilateralism’ and international law, as codified by the United Nations, the Council 
of Europe and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Yet other 
goals and objectives have progressively come to trump the EU’s normative agenda vis-à-vis 
Russia. In particular, since the beginning of President Putin’s second mandate in 2004, the EU 
has mainly acted in pursuit of its energy interests and pushed for Russia’s WTO accession in 
order to make Russia a more economically attractive, credible and trustworthy partner. 
Normative goals have thus remained dead letter, while concrete actions have focused on the 
pursuit of narrow possession objectives.  
4.2 Non-normative means 
The EU’s normative goals vis-à-vis Russia have thus been sidelined, as the relationship has 
evolved through cooperation on an issue-by-issue basis achieving progress on several concrete 
issues such as visa facilitation. The most visible example of the EU’s normative neglect in its 
ties to Russia has been its stance on the Chechen conflict, in which Russia has adamantly 
refused international interference and the EU has accepted Moscow’s view, treating Russia as a 
partner – despite the growing normative gap between the two. Even during times of crisis, Putin 
has been received by EU leaders as a special guest (for instance, during the Lahti informal 
summit in October 2006).  
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The EU has established a specific institutionalised human rights dialogue with Russia since 
March 2005, which was considered a notable normative achievement. But consultations never 
took place in Russia and the dialogue appears to have become an empty shell. Recently, the 
Mafra Summit has evidenced the EU’s inability to use effectively the dialogue with Russia, with 
the failure to agree upon an OSCE election observer mission in Russia for December 2007. 
There is some wishful thinking on the European side that the dialogue could produce its desired 
effects in the long-term. Yet the EU is unlikely to socialise Russia into human rights 
observance, as opposed to the case of Eastern enlargement.  
In recent years, the goal of promoting peace has made it onto the EU-Russia agenda with 
institutionalised dialogue covering the frozen conflicts in Moldova and Georgia and the 
adoption of the Road Map for the third common space in November 2005. Nonetheless, these 
conflicts are not addressed in a manner that challenges Russia’s primary and not always 
constructive role in these conflicts (Pozzo di Borgo, 2007, pp. 25-27). In particular, the EU has 
done nothing to alter Russian coercive policies such as its selective visa and trade restrictions on 
Georgia and Moldova. 
Technical assistance and aid to Russia are also not consistent with the EU’s declared normative 
goals. Since 1994, enlargement became an EU priority and since 1999 this tendency was 
reinforced. In relative terms, Russia like other non-accession countries lost out as a result of this 
reprioritisation. More specifically, EU aid to Russia as a proportion of the Union’s external 
assistance budget has decreased over the years (Fernandes, 2006). This trend is set to continue 
as Russia now seems unwilling to receive assistance through the ENPI (European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument), because of its economic recovery and growing 
national pride. Political conditionality as a means to achieve normative goals is also not being 
effectively used in the case of Russia. 
4.3 Non-normative results 
Not only have EU policies failed to induce Russia’s compliance on democracy, human rights 
and conflict resolution. Far more seriously, the EU’s declaratory insistence on its common 
principles with Russia has contributed to an unexpected boomerang effect in Russia. The 
Kremlin reasserts Russia’s cultural specificity and its right to have a different interpretation of 
democracy (‘sovereign democracy’). More recently, President Putin has criticised the 
democratic shortcomings in several member states and the US, while strengthening his control 
over Russian public opinion through the media and restrictions on and repression of NGOs and 
political opposition. This tendency has become particularly acute in the run-up to the Russian 
elections in the fall of 2007, which have seen a peak in Slavophile discourses. The human rights 
dialogue with the EU thus seems to be provoking a negative effect rather than stimulating 
convergence on the basis of shared values. On the one hand, some member states feel 
disappointed and deceived by Moscow, while on the other hand, Russia feels misperceived and 
devalued by a self-righteous EU (Entin, 2006). The EU’s attempt to engage Russia on Moldova 
and Georgia’s conflicts has also not borne concrete results. On the contrary, Russia views the 
ENP as unwelcome interference in its ‘near abroad’, albeit not as problematic as the 
engagement of NATO or the US (with its anti-missile project). In general, the EU’s post-
enlargement aims in the common neighbourhood are those of a post-modern actor, contrasting 
with Russia’s traditional sovereign prerogatives (Epstein & Gheciu, 2006; White, 2005). Instead 
of becoming a normalised European partner, Russia is becoming an increasingly challenging 
foreign policy actor. When Europeans strive for a common internal energy policy and an 
engagement with Russia to regulate the energy market, Russia’s reaction is to seal bilateral 
agreements with select member states to secure supplies to national consumers, as well as to 
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create a strong Gazprom monopoly and a sister of this company in the civil nuclear realm 
(Atomenergoprom) in order to consolidate its monopoly in the electricity market. 
4.4 Conditioning factors 
Internal political context 
Although the EU declares a set of milieu goals in its relations with Russia, these are not 
consistently pursued; while possession goals, related to energy and the penetration of Russian 
markets, often take the upper hand. This is largely explained by the EU’s internal political 
context, whereby Russia has been able to play national European interests against each other 
undermining an integrated EU approach. There is an EU demand to bind Russia to common 
economic rules (milieu goals), but there is also a lack of internal consensus about which rules 
should apply. Indeed there are different national perspectives in the EU on Russia and there is 
no consensual approach towards Moscow. Some member states wish to reconsider cooperation 
with Russia on the basis of Russia’s non-normative behaviour, while others favour a more 
pragmatic approach (Allison et al., 2006). For instance, the three Baltic states and Poland are 
prone to defend a united EU voice towards Russia and to deal with Russia at the EU level on all 
issues. Others, like France, Germany and Italy, have privileged bilateral relations with Moscow. 
On energy in particular, bilateral agreements have been celebrated last year to secure gas 
supplies between several member states and Russia.  
Internal capacity 
The Union’s relative power vis-à-vis Russia and its sui generis nature constrain its capacity to 
pursue normative goals towards Russia with success. Internally, there is no straightforward 
process whereby a bilateral member state problem with Moscow can be translated and tackled at 
EU level, despite growing intra-EU solidarity at the level of rhetoric. There is also a lack of 
integrated EU foreign policies in general and external energy policy in particular, again, 
inducing member states to go-it-alone with Moscow. In turn, member states and the EU as a 
whole fall back to a disintegrated pursuit of security and commercial goals towards Russia 
partly because of insufficient capacity at EU level.  
External environment 
The external environment also explains why the EU has acted as an intended realpolitik player 
vis-à-vis Russia. Most importantly, Russia is increasingly able to reject what it perceives as an 
imposed convergence on EU standards and insists on the recognition of its specificities 
(Massias, 2007) by successfully using its energy leverage and playing divide and rule between 
member states. The increasingly hardline attitude of Putin’s regime, aided by the Kremlin’s re-
found role in the regional and global scene, makes it less likely for the EU to insist on its 
normative agenda. The Russian veto in the UN Security Council and its ability to block progress 
on several ‘hot’ international issues, such as Kosovo, as we shall see below, further heighten 
Moscow’s assertiveness towards the EU. Furthermore, the EU’s strategic alliance with the US 
adds a further external constraint to a normative EU approach towards Russia.   
12 | TOCCI WITH DARBOUCHE, EMERSON, FERNANDES, HANAU-SANTINI, NOUTCHEVA & PORTELA 
5. Policies towards Syria, 2003-07: Realpolitik Unintended 
Contributed by Ruth Hanau Santini 
5.1 Non-normative goals 
EU policies towards Syria represent an interesting case in several respects. First, the Middle 
East is the only region that was singled out in the 2003 Security Strategy as an area, beyond the 
Union’s immediate neighbourhood, of significant geo-strategic interest and concern to the EU, 
in which the Union is intent in promoting political and economic development in line with its 
proclaimed norms. Second, the EU’s repeatedly asserted claim regarding the need to uphold 
multilateral institutions and reinforce their global role directly impacts upon the EU’s external 
action in the Middle East in view of the frequent crises in the region and related UN resolutions. 
This has made the Middle East in general a litmus test for the EU’s foreign policy consistency. 
In this context, Syria plays a special role, given its close involvement in Lebanese affairs, in 
which several EU member states are present under the aegis of the UN, and given the 
importance of a future peace agreement between Syria and Israel in paving the way for an 
overarching Arab-Israeli peace.  
Up until World War II, Europe was perceived by Syria as an imperial power, due to French 
colonial ties in the Levant and British interests in the broader Middle East. At that time, in view 
of its non-involvement in Arab affairs, a Wilsonian US enjoyed a more positive reputation in 
the area. For Syria the tide changed in 1948 with the creation of the state of Israel, staunchly 
backed by the US, particularly after 1967. In Washington, the determining factor changing the 
relationship with Syria was the country’s slide into the Soviet camp. In 1979, Syria was inserted 
on the list of states sponsoring terrorism, leading to the imposition of US sanctions. The EU 
instead, having suffered from the 1970s’ oil crises and seeking secure energy supplies, signed a 
Cooperation Agreement with Syria in 1977, and its political rhetoric started displaying a far 
more pro-Arab attitude. The relevance of Syria as an oil provider is still far from negligible: in 
2004 Syria was the EU’s 9th largest source of imports in this sector. Energy has indeed been the 
most discernible European interest in Syria at least until the beginning of the Oslo process 
which promised regional agreements between Israel and its neighbours. With the beginning of 
the Oslo process in the 1990s, Brussels began redressing the balance between the pursuit of its 
possession (i.e. energy security) and milieu (i.e., regional peace and stability, normalising 
Syria’s regional and international role) goals. In other words, since the 1990s, two principal 
European objectives have dominated relations with Syria: safe access to Syrian oil reserves and 
an attempt to influence Damascus’ behaviour towards Israel without, however,undermining US 
policy preferences. 
Yet by favouring the status quo in the regional balance of power and following American policy 
imperatives, the European room for manoeuvre and its potential influence on the peace process 
have been limited. Up until 2003, Brussels timidly tried to promote a resumption of negotiations 
with Israel over the Golan Heights and the Sheeba farms. With the launch of the Quartet’s ‘road 
map to peace’ in April 2003, however, the Syria-Israel (as well as the Lebanon-Israel) tracks 
have been excluded from the political agenda. Hence, despite diplomatic talk of a 
‘comprehensive settlement’, the EU has considerably narrowed its political goals, failing to 
provide a much-needed holistic approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This realpolitik approach 
not only reflects a short-sighted attitude towards the conflict, but, as detailed below, it is 
fundamentally linked to the US resistance to engaging in dialogue with Damascus. Finally, the 
non-normative nature of EU policy goals vis-à-vis Syria is exemplified by the residual role of 
democracy promotion in what is mainly an economic relationship based on trade and energy. It 
could be argued that the EU’s liberal reform paradigm, which posits that economic reform 
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would lead to political reform, has normative content. Yet, the unwillingness of EU leaders to 
advance a political reform agenda in Syria points unambiguously to a realpolitik approach 
rather than a cautiously normative one.  
5.2 Non-normative means 
With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the Middle Eastern Peace Process (MEPP), 
Syria has been involved in EU-promoted regional stabilisation and alleged democratisation 
efforts through the Barcelona Process. EU-Syrian relations also foresaw the drafting of an 
Association Agreement (AA), covering the three (economic, political and cultural) baskets of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. After years of standstill, in October 2004 negotiations on 
an agreement appeared to be on the verge of successful conclusion (Raphaeli, 2007). In these 
talks Syria had allegedly agreed to sign a non-proliferation clause, which together with the 
December 2003 WMD strategy is designed to be inserted in all agreements with third countries. 
After initial resistance justified by Israel’s rejection of an analogous clause in its Association 
Agreement with the EU, Damascus demonstrated its goodwill. Furthermore, in December 2003, 
Syria introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a WMD-free zone in the 
Middle East (Zunes, 2004, p. 163). While not representing a watershed in EU-Syrian economic 
relations (the AA would have only marginally upgraded the 1977 agreement, given the 
persisting limits on agricultural trade), the conclusion of the agreement would have sent a strong 
political signal not only to Damascus but also to Israel and the US concerning the EU’s 
seriousness in its conduct of the relationship. 
Yet with Washington’s adoption of a new set of sanctions in May 2004, the US began exerting 
strong pressure on EU member states to resist the EU-Syrian agreement. Alongside this, 
European attitudes towards engagement with Syria became increasingly negative after the 
assassination of the Lebanese anti-Syrian Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. In turn, 
negotiations were halted and, beyond not extending benefits to Syria, the EU undertook 
negative measures by imposing a freeze on Syrian funds and included several Syrian suspects in 
its terrorist list. Moreover, the EU strongly backed UN efforts to establish an international 
tribunal regarding the Hariri murder, a tribunal whose sole mandate is to try Syria. Hence, rather 
than using the potential of contractual relations to engage and influence Syria within the 
framework of EU laws and rules (as in the case of Eastern Europe), the Union opted to sideline 
the AA and use its non-conclusion as an additional stick on Syria. In a visit to Damascus in 
March 2007, in fact, EU High Representative Javier Solana (2007) declared that the AA would 
be “unlocked” only “if Syria acts against the suspected flow of weapons to Lebanon and helps 
ease tensions between the pro-western government and the pro-Syrian opposition”. The absence 
of the agreement also reduced the EU’s ability to influence Syria’s participation in the 
November 2007 Annapolis conference and its aftermath.  
Finally, EU aid to the southern Mediterranean, as in the case of Russia, also highlights the 
absence of a strong normative commitment: €800 million in 2005 were directed to programmes 
dealing with the control of illegal immigration, while a mere €10 million were channelled 
through the European Initiative on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The tune is 
strikingly similar when one looks at individual member states’ democracy assistance: with the 
exception of Central Asia, the Middle East is the region receiving the least money from member 
states. Brussels of course did play a part in inducing Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, 
but it did not do so in the name of democracy in Syria. On the contrary, some EU ‘governance 
projects’ have been co-opted by the ruling Syrian elite to strengthen the state’s capacities, while 
on the rare occasions in which domestic opposition has been voiced in Syria (as in 2006), 
Brussels has shied away from lending active support.  
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5.3 Normative results 
Quite unexpectedly, Syria has nonetheless skilfully and instrumentally adopted a number of 
relatively normative policies. It would be mistaken to trace these policy shifts exclusively to the 
EU. On the contrary, as and when the EU opted not to be a partner of Syria, it opened the space 
for greater interference by other actors.  
This notwithstanding, several normative shifts can be detected. The first is Syria’s withdrawal 
from Lebanon. In the aftermath of the Hariri assassination and following the 14 March group’s 
protests against Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs, in April 2005 (after UNSC Resolution 
1559 in September 2004 calling for ‘all remaining forces’ to withdraw from Lebanon), 
Damascus withdrew its military forces from Lebanon. It is important to point out, however, that 
despite ending a three-decade-long military presence in Lebanon, Damascus still exercises 
significant influence over Lebanese political life. A second manifestation of goodwill vis-à-vis 
multilateral institutions was Damascus’ acceptance of a reinforced UNIFIL mission patrolling 
its borders with Lebanon in the aftermath of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon. 
What would have been probably considered as a blow to national sovereignty was deemed as an 
act of constructive cooperation. Finally, Syria has manifested an attitude of cautious opening 
towards Israel, signalling its predisposition to resume talks. This reveals Syria’s will to reduce 
its international isolation, and thus diminish Syria’s dependence on Iran, to which Damascus 
only attaches tactical value. 
5.4 Conditioning factors 
Despite the EU’s role as a secondary player, how have EU policies interacted with and 
influenced Syria’s partial normative shift?  
Internal interests 
Internal EU interests, while divided, by and large tip in favour of the EU’s non-normative 
objectives vis-à-vis Syria. The main cleavage within the EU is between those prioritising a 
comprehensive peace deal in the region and those whose transatlantic loyalty trumps all other 
objectives and thus shapes EU policy choices towards Syria. To date, the latter school of 
thought has taken precedence. The ratification of the AA with Syria failed as a consequence of 
the interplay between a changed political climate after the murder of PM Hariri (particularly in 
view of the strong ties between Jacques Chirac’s France and the Hariri family) and US pressure 
on some member states to postpone ratification. The AA was strongly resisted by the US, which 
feared that this would have paved the way for further EU-Syria economic ties (e.g. through the 
ENP) and bolstered Syrian claims to enter the WTO, thus reducing the effectiveness of 
Washington’s cornering strategy. Alongside France’s strong ties with the anti-Syrian camp in 
Lebanon, the transatlantic priorities of several member states have represented the single-most 
important factor driving the deadlock in EU-Syria relations and limiting Damascus’ options to 
end its international isolation. 
Internal capability 
Beyond divided interests, does or would the EU possess the political clout and economic 
leverage in its relations with Damascus? EU-Syrian economic relations, despite being 
significant in relative terms, remain limited to a few sectors and their intensity has decreased in 
recent years. In terms of engendering political reforms instead, the ‘Governance Facility’ in the 
context of the ENP could be directed to Syria to support reforms. But so long as Syria is 
excluded de facto from the ENP (i.e. up until the conclusion of the AA) and as long as it does 
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not proceed willingly on reforms (for which it could be ‘rewarded’ through the Governance 
Facility), this potential is unlikely to materialise.  
The external environment 
Despite the EU’s limited capabilities and its divided interests, some normative results can be 
detected. The most relevant explanation accounting for this is the role of the external 
environment. On the one hand, is the Union’s dependence upon US policy in the region: in view 
of US pressure on Syria and heightened concerns over WMD proliferation, the EU has 
essentially bended its policies and interests in order to accommodate Washington. This strategic 
choice, exemplified by the Union’s freezing or severing of ties with Damascus, represents the 
Union’s preference to maintain close ranks with the US irrespective of its normative agenda in 
Syria and in the region in general, as noted below in the Israel-Palestine case study as well. The 
second factor explaining the unintended normative results is instead Damascus’ shaky reliance 
on problematic regional partners. In sharp contrast to the case of Belarus, which feels bolstered 
by Russian support, the Ba’athist regime, feeling regionally cornered, has only cultivated 
relations with Iran and Turkey. On the one hand, Iran has provided the necessary security 
umbrella for the small Levant country, shielding Syria from threats emanating from regional 
adversaries and international actors such as the US. Yet this is a double-edged sword, as 
Damascus’ association with Teheran is both unreliable and has complicated further Syria’s 
relations with the West, including the EU. In the current situation, Syria is in fact increasingly 
entrapped. To escape this bind, Syria has intensified its economic and military cooperation with 
Turkey, epitomised by the opening of a Free Trade Area in 2007. Turkey’s close ties with the 
West and its friendly relations with Israel explain Syria’s attempt to forge ties with Ankara, in 
order to hedge against the possibility that its ties with Tehran become increasingly costly.   
6. Policies towards Kosovo, 1999-2007: Imperialistic Intended 
Contributed by Gergana Noutcheva 
6.1 Normative Goals 
If there is one overarching goal in the EU’s complex involvement in Kosovo, it is the peaceful 
settlement of Kosovo’s final status through a long-lasting solution. Kosovo has been on the 
EU’s security agenda since the establishment of a UN administration of the province in 1999, 
following NATO’s military strikes against the Milosevic regime and the subsequent withdrawal 
of the Serbian army from Kosovo’s territory. Since then, Kosovo has been a UN protectorate 
with its external status awaiting a final settlement. Officially the province remains part of 
Serbia, although Belgrade has no effective control over the territory.3 The Kosovar population 
and the international community consider the status quo as unsustainable and negotiations have 
been under way throughout 2006 and 2007 to find a compromise solution.  
Normative discourse on conflict resolution notwithstanding, the EU has high stakes in settling 
the matter. In other words, its milieu and possession goals largely overlap. In the 1990s, the 
EU’s international reputation suffered a big loss in the face of its incapacity to prevent and stop 
the bloodshed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. In the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, the EU 
tried to reverse this image and took the lead in the economic reconstruction of the province 
under UN auspices.4 It included Kosovo in all its regional initiatives designed to stabilise the 
                                                     
3 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) regulates the protectorate status of Kosovo as well as its 
legal relationship with Serbia.  
4 The EU takes the lead of the economic pillar of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
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Western Balkans, such as the Stability Pact for South East Europe, the Stabilisation and 
Association Process and the CARDS programme for financial assistance. Above all, the EU 
extended the membership prospect to Kosovo and it did so without prejudice as to the final 
status outcome.5 In short, goodwill on the EU’s side to help resolve the problem was not 
lacking, although the Union has not been in the lead in proposing a concrete plan for the 
settlement of the conflict.  
The EU has opted to play a secondary role on the status question by supporting the UN-led 
process to define the parameters of a mutually acceptable compromise. Officially, the EU has 
abstained from favouring any outcome, although it has made clear that certain propositions 
would not be acceptable as a matter of principle, such as the partition of Kosovo or its 
unification with another state (European Council, 2005). This is to say that a scenario 
envisaging a change of borders is a non-starter as far as the EU is concerned, given the latent 
grievances of various minorities in the region and the considerable international efforts already 
invested in former Yugoslavia to promote multi-culturalism and respect for minority rights. 
Furthermore, the EU’s support for the ‘standards before status’ policy that characterised the 
UN-led post-war involvement in Kosovo also attests to the high priority the EU placed on the 
democratic development of Kosovo, irrespective of its final status. Whereas one can doubt the 
feasibility of democratic governance in a legally undefined and socially contested polity, the 
EU’s emphasis on democracy and the rule of law in Kosovo can be viewed as part and parcel of 
the Union’s overall normative objectives in Kosovo.  
6.2 Non-normative means 
Despite these normative goals, the international efforts to resolve Kosovo’s conflict of which 
the EU has been part, have deviated from international legal norms and multilateral frameworks. 
This goes back to the 1999 NATO military strikes against the Milosevic regime, which many 
EU member states supported and directly took part in but which occurred without the official 
authorisation of the UN Security Council. Russia and China blocked the UN channel at the time 
and Western powers led by the US bypassed the formal procedures and resorted to force in 
violation of international law. Gross human rights violations and even threatened genocide were 
cited as reasons for NATO’s military actions but this ‘normative’ goal was pursued in breach of 
international law and in violation of the multilateral principles governing the international 
system.  
The negotiations on the ‘Ahtisaari plan’ for ‘supervised independence’ of Kosovo is another 
example of the resort to means that are not entirely respectful of international rules and norms of 
multilateralism. In mid-March 2007, the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for 
Kosovo’s status talks, Maarti Ahtisaari, presented his comprehensive proposal recommending 
eventual independence for Kosovo as well as extensive guarantees for the Serbian minority in 
the province through institutionalised decentralisation and international presence on the ground 
to monitor implementation. It was the West’s hope that Ahtisaari’s proposal would be endorsed 
by the UN Security Council through a new resolution, paving the way for the deployment of an 
EU civilian mission in Kosovo (ICG, 2007). The plan, however, was rejected by Russia, with 
China expressing unease and opposition to it as well. To appease Russian and Serbian 
objections, a second round of direct negotiations between the Serbs and the Kosovars was 
launched in June 2007, with the mediation of an international troika – the US, the EU and 
Russia. In essence, this step moved the process beyond the UN’s multilateral framework and 
                                                     
5 The EU’s heads of state extended the membership perspective to the Western Balkans at the Feira 
European Council in 2000 and reconfirmed their commitment to the region at the Thessaloniki European 
Council in 2003.  
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away from earlier ideas about seeking agreement on a new UN Security Council Resolution that 
would settle Kosovo’s status. While formally not in breach of legal norms, this negotiating 
format deviates from formal UN channels.  
Without prejudice to final status, the EU has prepared to deploy a civilian rule of law mission in 
the aftermath of a settlement. It has signalled that it will launch an ESDP operation on the legal 
basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, without explicit UN authorisation. This 
broad interpretation of the legally permissible actions under UNSCR1244 has been the EU's 
second-best choice, yet the only feasible option given the lack of consensus among the 
permanent five members of the UN Security Council on a new resolution. Furthermore, on the 
controversial issue of Kosovo's status, the EU has silently participated in a gradual process of 
legitimising an outcome of independence.The Troika process has given the EU a more visible 
and responsible international role in settling the matter, intensifying the debates among the 
member states on possible scenarios and action plans. Starting from the proposition that there is 
no viable alternative that would ensure peace and stability, EU member states have 
progressively converged on the independence option, even though publicly they have refrained 
from taking a position, contrary to the US which has firmly and openly backed Kosovo’s 
independence (Moore, 2007). In other words, whereas the EU’s aims may merit the label 
‘normative’, the way in which the Union has deployed its policy instruments has not been 
entirely in line with its self-professed backing of the international legal order.  
6.3 Normative results 
The outcome for Kosovo is of course still unknown, but the two parties’ positions have 
remained as diametrically opposed today as when negotiations started in 2006. Pristina refuses 
to acquiesce to anything that falls short of independence, while Belgrade refuses to agree to 
anything that undermines its territorial integrity. This leaves international mediators to weigh 
and adjudicate the legal and moral arguments behind different solutions.  
The normative argument in support of Kosovo’s independence is grounded in ‘just secession’ 
theories justifying claims to self-determination as a last resort when serious injustice has been 
committed against a community by a state (Coppieters & Sakwa, 2003). The mass violation of 
human rights of the Albanian population in the 1990s by the Milosevic regime constitutes the 
basis for accepting Kosovo’s claim to self-determination. The international legal system, 
however, protects the sovereignty of states and thus Serbia’s borders. Violating such norms also 
creates dangerous precedents that threaten to undermine the international legal order. The EU 
has presented Kosovo as a sui generis case, but no persuasive argument has been advanced as to 
why it is special (or more special) compared to other cases and thus why it should be treated 
differently.  
Hence, while a normative case for Kosovo’s independence exists, it has not been made 
convincingly by the EU or any other international actor. This raises legitimate questions as to 
the extent to which Kosovo’s eventual independence can be used as a model for resolving other 
secessionist conflicts in the world. If priority is to be given to the protection of individual 
human rights over state sovereignty, the implications for the international system as a whole are 
potentially very serious. The EU has dismissed such interpretation, but the issue has already 
entered the public debate over other ‘frozen conflicts’ (Socor, 2007). In the absence of a clear 
explanation of the uniqueness of Kosovo’s case, this selective application of new rules strongly 
hints at the West’s (and the EU’s) hegemonic behaviour, even if in the name of allegedly 
normative ends. Aware of the European (and American) position, it seems likely that Kosovo 
will ultimately declare independence and not reintegrate into Serbia. 
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6.4 Conditioning factors 
What explains the EU’s ‘imperialistic intended’ foreign policy in Kosovo? Two factors seem 
critical. On the one hand, EU security interests call for an efficient solution that minimises 
security risks in terms of instability and resort to violence. On the other hand, the EU is 
constrained by the international setting, in particular by an uncooperative Russia suspected of 
using every opportunity to block established multilateral channels in order to advance its own 
international agenda. 
Internal interests  
On the substance of the status settlement, EU member states have been divided and as such are 
unable to take a firm stance. It is no secret that member states such as Spain, Greece, Cyprus, 
Slovakia and Romania are not keen on recognising an independent Kosovo for fear of sending 
the wrong message to their own sizable minorities as well as to secessionist movements 
elsewhere. In this context, the Kosovo discussions in the EU have focused more on the need to 
preserve unity among the member states and to speak with a single voice than on what is 
normatively desirable for Kosovo itself.   
Division on substance notwithstanding, the EU unanimously views Kosovo as a security 
problem that needs to be fixed. There is a sense of urgency within EU policy-making circles to 
close the chapter and move on, allowing the conflict parties to concentrate their energies on 
domestic governance in the framework of the accession process. Furthermore, in so far as 
Kosovo is a ‘European problem’, given its geographical location and EU membership prospects, 
member states feel the responsibility to actively contribute to a lasting solution. In this context, 
even the more sceptical member states seem to appreciate that independence has progressively 
grown to represent the only viable option for stability and peace in Western Balkans.  
External environment  
In addition, the internal situation in Kosovo itself has not only called for urgent action but also 
shaped perceptions of what is a feasible and durable outcome. Without a clearly defined status, 
Kosovo has been on life support from international donors for almost a decade. Economic 
development and modernisation have been severely hampered by the uncertainty surrounding its 
constitutional future. The social cost for the population has grown heavier with young 
generations facing no bright prospects for professional realisation and losing patience with the 
status quo. In short, the domestic situation has urged determined international action, with the 
Kosovar leadership declaring independence unilaterally in December 2007, if no mediated 
solution is found by then.  
Yet, on the other hand, the wider international context has induced the EU to pursue its goals in 
non-normative ways. As noted also in the Russian case study, the EU is confronted with an 
increasingly assertive Moscow, which, in its comeback on the international scene, uses all 
means at its disposal to assert its role and presence in an often-confrontational manner. While 
the EU would like to treat Russia as an equal partner, Russia’s positions are often seen as 
pursing narrow self-interest rather than contributing to the solution of international problems. 
Hence, the EU and the US have found themselves induced to stretch the interpretation of 
international legal norms and work around multilateral channels in order to avoid complete 
blockage. The international environment therefore also partly accounts for EU policy towards 
Kosovo, as well as for the results on the ground.     
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7. Policies towards Israel-Palestine, 2000-07: Imperialistic Unintended 
Contributed by Nathalie Tocci 
7.1 Normative goals 
The aim of a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has consistently been 
amongst the EU’s principal foreign policy goals (Tocci, 2005). The articulation of these goals 
has been distinctly ‘normative’. More specifically, the EU’s declared goals have been based on 
two interconnected pillars. The first pillar is the need to respect the self-determination rights of 
the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. The EU historically upheld Israel’s right to statehood, living 
in peace within secure and internationally recognised borders. The European position towards 
the Palestinians was defined progressively over the decades, first acknowledging the Palestinian 
right to self-determination in the 1980 Venice Declaration and culminating with the 1999 
European Council in Berlin, which affirmed that “the creation of a democratic, viable and 
peaceful sovereign Palestinian state…would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security” 
(European Council, 1999). With the collapse of the Oslo process in 2000, the Union explicitly 
advocated the creation of two states, Israel and Palestine. The state of Palestine would be viable, 
independent and sovereign, and it would be established along the 1967 borders.  
The second pillar has been the importance of respecting human rights and international 
humanitarian law (IHL) as well as democratic standards and good governance. Most European 
declarations on the Middle East conflict since the 1970s have condemned Palestinian violence 
and terrorism. Since 1973, member states have criticised the acquisition of territory by force, 
called upon Israel to end the occupation of the territories it conquered in 1967, and opposed 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (OTs) in violation of the 4th Geneva Convention 
(European Council, 1990). Since 2000, the Union has re-intensified its calls to halt and reverse 
settlement construction and condemned Palestinian suicide bombings, Israeli military 
incursions, extra-judicial killings, forms of collective punishment as well as the construction of 
the West Bank barrier. EU declarations advocating a Palestinian state have added that such a 
state should be democratic and well governed, calling for the reform of the PA.  
7.2 Non-normative means 
Despite the consistent formulation of normative foreign policy goals, the Union has frequently 
refrained from pursuing its goals in a normative way. Beginning with the association 
agreements with Israel and the PA, the EU has never made use of its rights embedded in the 
essential elements (Art. 2) and non-execution (Art. 79) clauses to suspend the agreements on the 
grounds of the gross violations of international law, human rights and democratic standards 
(EMHRN, 2005, 2007). The inclusion of Israel and the PA in the ENP does not promise to alter 
this fact. Vis-à-vis the Palestinians, the ENP has been frozen since the 2006 election of Hamas, 
and may be reactivated only with the unelected Fatah government in the West Bank. Vis-à-vis 
Israel, only one in six ‘priorities for action’ in the Action Plan refers to the conflict and human 
rights, and does so in a vague and open-ended manner (Tocci, 2007a, chapter 6).  
Far more seriously, the EU has risked acquiescing to Israel’s violations of international law 
(Tocci, 2007a, chapter 6 and EMHRN, 2005). One example of this has been the preferential 
export of Israeli goods produced in settlements, where the Union has risked acquiescing to 
Israel’s application of the AA to the OTs, thus extending EU trade benefits to settlement 
enterprises. An analogous problem lies in the area of research, where Israel has considered as 
eligible for EU funding Israeli entities within the OTs, leading to EU financing under its 
Framework Programmes of several settlement entities. Future problems are likely to emerge in 
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other fields. In the context of the ENP, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), tailored to border regions, does not include safeguard mechanisms to ensure that funds 
will not be directed to support actors or actions that contravene public international law in the 
OTs.  
The (non)-normative dimension of EU policies is more nuanced when it comes to the area of 
PA reform. Particularly in 2002-05, the Union was relatively successful in conditioning its aid 
policies to constitutional, judicial and fiscal reforms of the PA. The EU also went the extra mile 
to ensure that EU funds were not redirected to finance political violence. However, the Union 
has also been unwilling to completely suspend aid to the PA, an act that would trigger the 
collapse of the Authority and oblige Israel to undertake its financial responsibilities as the 
occupying power. This has given rise to a critical dilemma, exemplified by the post-2006 
Palestinian election period. Following the election of Hamas, the Union accepted the Quartet’s 
conditions on the new PA government. Yet with the exception of conditionality on violence – 
which the Union is bound by in view of Hamas’s inclusion in the EU terrorist list – the 
remaining two conditions have extremely shaky legal grounds (Tocci, 2007b). Yet not only has 
the Union endorsed legally questionable conditions. It has also been unwilling to follow through 
with its policy, fearing a total collapse of the PA. By May 2006, the EU partially resumed aid 
through a Temporary International Mechanism, intended to bypass the Hamas government by 
relying on the presidency and international organisations and directly providing material 
supplies and financial allowances to individuals. While leading to a 30% rise of EU aid, the 
manner in which aid has been delivered has reversed the partial steps forward in PA reform 
promoted by the EU in previous years. The situation worsened still after the political violence 
and ensuing separation between Fatah/West Bank and Hamas/Gaza in June 2007, leading to the 
establishment of an unelected Fatah government in the West Bank to whom the EU has 
enthusiastically resumed aid and the re-empowerment of the more hardline elements within 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip.   
7.3 Non-normative results 
The EU, as a secondary external actor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could not have 
represented the major determinant in the evolution of the conflict. Yet, in light of the EU’s 
highly developed bilateral relations with the parties, has the Union put its policy means to the 
best use? The answer is largely negative. In a structural context of Israeli dominance and 
Palestinian weakness, there has been a diminishing prospect for the establishment of a viable 
Palestinian state in view of Israel’s accelerating colonisation of the OTs. Despite its declaratory 
support for a two-state solution, EU policies have reinforced this trend. Over the Oslo years, the 
EU supported the PA and the peace process, without paying much attention to the PA’s 
performance and Israel’s expanding grip on the OTs. Since then, EU efforts have mitigated the 
humanitarian effects of the conflict by pouring aid into Palestine (Le More, 2005). Yet aid to 
Palestine and acquiescence to Israel have supported the deteriorating trends on the ground, 
which are likely to persist despite the Annapolis conference and the ensuing process in the fall 
of 2007. 
7.4 Conditioning factors 
What explains the EU’s behaviour as an ‘unintended imperialistic actor’ in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict? Why has the Union failed to contribute to an approximation of its 
normative goals in the Middle East conflict? 
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Internal interests 
The principal and most convincing factor explaining why the Union has deployed its policy 
instruments in contradiction with its normative goals lies in the EU’s internally competing 
interest agenda. It would be mistaken to view the Union’s advocacy of a rights-bound, two-state 
solution in the Middle East as being purely hypocritical. Indeed, as discussed above, the EU’s 
goals in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been distinctly normative. Yet while the Union 
might genuinely support these milieu goals, its concomitant pursuit of possession objectives 
have induced the EU to deploy its policies in non-normative ways. In the Middle East, the 
Union has viewed the protection of Israel and close relations with it as a high order priority. 
Europe’s history of anti-Semitism has generated a deep-felt preference, particularly in some 
member states, to foster close relations with Israel and promote its security. Although the EU 
has repeatedly underlined that a two-state solution is the only long-term guarantee of Israel’s 
security, the EU majority has also wished to avoid antagonising Israel through concrete 
responses to its conduct in the conflict. This has occurred to the extent of bending the Union’s 
own laws and rules for the sake of accommodating (illegal) Israeli policies.  
Another competing EU interest in the Middle East that has trumped the pursuit of the EU’s 
normative agenda has been the priority to seek close and cooperative relations with the US. As 
in the case of Syria discussed above, this has generated also in the Israel-Palestine context 
strong EU incentives to accommodate American policies. During the Oslo process, this meant 
that irrespective of the parties’ conduct on the ground, the Union’s priority to keep the US-
sponsored peace process alive meant refraining from criticising the conflict parties’ actions on 
the ground. Post-Oslo, it has led to a considerable EU focus on Palestinian reform only when 
this was the main tune played in Washington. Once that tune changed (following the election of 
Hamas), the EU’s priority to rebuild bridges with Washington on the Middle East (after the Iraq 
war) has led the EU to undo its partial reform successes in Palestine and first boycott the 
Hamas-led government and then opt to support its unelected Fatah branch in the West Bank.  
Internal capability 
Capability or rather limited capability provides a second explanation of the EU’s convergence 
on a non-normative deployment of policy instruments. On the one hand, it lacks the necessary 
‘hard power’ to compel the parties to alter their conduct. On the other hand, its relational power 
vis-à-vis Israel is supposedly weak, in so far as the EU gains from key commercial advantages 
in its relations with Israel which it is unwilling to rescind. Yet these arguments belittle the fact 
that Israel accords high value to its relations with the EU. Israel is a small country, whose 
openness to international trade is critical to its economic survival. The EU is Israel’s largest 
trading partner. The political value attributed by Israel to the EU is arguably even more 
important, in so far as Israel’s desire of finding a place of belonging in Europe (rather than in 
the Middle East) is deeply embedded in the Israeli Jewish majority (of European descent). 
Hence while salient, internal capability (or lack thereof) only provides a limited explanation of 
EU policies, while the principal reason must be sought in the Union’s internal interest 
configuration.  
The external environment 
Finally, the external environment provides the principal explanation of the non-normative 
results on the ground. Developments in the conflict have been dictated mainly by domestic 
factors rather than by the EU (Karam et al., 2006). More specifically, the flaws in the Oslo 
process, which came to a head at the Camp David II summit, the unwillingness of Arafat to 
rein-in the intifada in its early stages, the election of Sharon and the subsequent escalation of 
violence and colonisation of the OTs underlie the shift away from a two-state solution and the 
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mounting violation of human rights and IHL. In particular since 2000, several interrelated 
features have constrained the EU’s role. In Israel, the feeling of existential threat aroused by 
Palestinian suicide attacks explained Sharon’s freehand in crushing the Palestinian uprising in 
open disregard of rights and law. The growing Israeli popular desire to ‘disengage’ from the 
Palestinians and the rising awareness of the ‘demographic threat’ posed by them underpinned 
the ‘separation barrier’, the Gaza disengagement and the preference for a unilateral pursuit of 
Israel’s perceived interests. The 2006 Lebanon war, Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007 and the 
Bush administration’s desire to resurrect its tarnished image in the Middle East explain both the 
resumption of a diplomatic process (in Annapolis) and the probability that – more so than the 
Oslo process – this is unlikely to alter facts on the ground.  
8. EU Trade Policy towards North Africa, 1995-2007: Status Quo 
Intended 
Contributed by Hakim Darbouche 
8.1 Non-normative goals 
The EU’s trade policy vis-à-vis North Africa, as encapsulated by the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and reinforced by the 2003 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), is 
characteristically introspective. Its intended goal is little more than the preservation of the 
asymmetrical balance of the EU’s trade relations with the region. Although avowedly predicated 
on the axiomatic tenets of free trade, the EU’s trade policy does not uphold reciprocity and 
fairness. The aim of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area by 2010, long viewed as 
the backbone of the Barcelona process, is now considered chimerical. Indeed the immediate 
visible goal behind this policy is the preservation of the EU’s status as the region’s main trading 
partner against a noticeably growing presence of American and Asian operators. By locking the 
North African countries into free-trade agreements, the EU hopes to deepen its commercial 
penetration in the region but fails to reciprocate by refusing to rid itself of the restricting 
interference of the Common Agricultural Policy and other Community policies. The resulting 
exemption of agricultural goods from trade liberalisation is far from beneficial for countries like 
Tunisia and Morocco whose main comparative advantage lies precisely in this sector. Besides 
sectoral protectionism, the notion of free trade between the EU and North Africa has been 
further undermined by restrictive regimes on the movement of people northwards.  
The EU’s trade policy towards the Maghreb has been formulated in the context of a broader 
policy framework providing for political and cultural ‘partnerships’ as well. As such it was said 
to have a normative vocation aimed at inducing political liberalisation. However, the failure of 
the EU to meaningfully promote democratic practices in these countries and its unwillingness to 
dialogue with all political actors in the region has confirmed its prioritisation of commercial 
self-interest over other considerations. In this vein, EU trade policy is also seen as aiming to 
reduce the flow of migrants from the Maghreb as concomitant FDI is expected to generate 
employment opportunities for the local workforce. But far from being a vehicle for the transfer 
of technology to the local economies, thus endowing them with a competitive edge, the quasi-
commercial nature of the FDI encouraged by the EU has further reinforced the recipients’ 
position as mere outlets for European goods.  
8.2 Normative means 
Contrary to past bilateral arrangements between the EU and the Maghreb countries, the Euro-
Med association agreements (AA) have been normatively less contentious relative to existing 
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GATT/WTO provisions. Despite ongoing polemics between the EU and its southern partners 
regarding agricultural trade liberalisation, the EU holds that a more restrictive regime in 
agriculture in the context of its free-trade agreements is admissible under Article XXIV of the 
GATT (Pierros et al., 1999, p. 194). As such, its non-normative trade policy goals in North 
Africa are being channelled through normative means. 
Furthermore, as its bilateral mechanisms, the AAs also reflect the principles of the Barcelona 
Declaration beyond mere trade. Besides the establishment of a free-trade area in order to share 
prosperity between the EU and its associates, the aims of these agreements are also to: a) 
facilitate the achievement of peace and stability, induce political dialogue and promote 
democratic practices and human rights; and b) promote inter-cultural dialogue so as to achieve 
understanding and rapprochement between the peoples of the region.  
Finally, the contents of the AAs, although broadly similar, have been specifically tailored to and 
carefully negotiated with the individual countries, explaining for instance the protracted 
negotiations in the case of Algeria. The implementation of the association ties has also been 
normatively crafted. After the ratification of the AAs by the national parliaments of all member 
states and those of the Maghreb countries, in addition to their scrutiny by the European 
Parliament, their implementation process is reviewed annually by association councils 
constituted of officials from the Commission and the respective partner country. Thus, 
structurally the AAs are the instruments of a partnership based on shared norms. Similarly, the 
ENP Action Plans (AP) provide the tools for deepened cooperation with the EU with a view to 
culminating in the progressive integration of the Maghreb economies into the EU’s internal 
market. By complementing both the structure and methodology of the AAs, the APs offer the 
means to the Maghreb countries to choose the areas of cooperation with the EU in which they 
wish to go further, based on mutually-delineated normative objectives. So far, however, only 
Morocco and Tunisia have opted for ENPAPs.  
8.3 Non-normative results  
Despite the normative instruments at its disposal, the EU’s trade policy has largely resulted in 
the reinforcement of the status quo which benefits the EU as the strongest actor more than its 
North African partners. In effect, the asymmetry in the trade relationship continues to favour the 
EU. While being the Maghreb countries’ major trading partner, the EU still exports a majority 
of capital and manufactured goods in return for raw material and semi-finished products. This 
pattern has kept the EU’s trade surplus with these countries intact, except with Algeria which, 
due to the high oil prices, has in recent years realised a trade surplus with the EU. Furthermore, 
the insignificance of intra-Maghreb trade, representing less than 5% of the region’s total, has 
exacerbated these countries’ dependence on the EU. Their failure to secure the EU’s reciprocity 
in liberalising its agricultural sector in return for their abolition of industrial barriers has brought 
extra costs onto their already weak economies. 
More importantly, the EU strategy has not helped the Maghreb economies develop efficient 
export-oriented industries, which are paramount for the success of their free-trade commitments. 
Their inability to attract the necessary FDI and acquire the required technological know-how 
due to the burdensome bureaucratic and financial structures of their economic apparatuses have 
been central to this failure. The expected impact of the AAs in addressing these shortfalls in the 
Maghreb economies has not materialised. The expected rationalisation and modernisation of 
these countries’ regulatory frameworks as a result of their interaction with the EU in the context 
of the AAs has been confronted with, and largely failed to overcome, the autocratic nature of the 
political regimes in place. The unwillingness of the EU to tackle the political deficiencies of the 
Maghreb countries in parallel with its trade policy has reduced the prospect not only of an 
effective economic liberalisation but of its eventual political spill-over as well.  
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The main beneficiaries of the EU’s trade policy towards the region are European businesses, 
which have had easier access to the markets of these countries and their counterparts in the 
Maghreb which operate on large-scale and have been active in foreign trade already. The latter’s 
links with the governments in place allow them to adapt and modernise through access to loans 
and foreign expertise often channelled through official institutions. This has allowed these local 
businesses to expand into monopolies, but their corrupt practices have prevented any wealth 
creation from trickling down to the broader society. Combined with increasing unemployment 
due to the dismantling of infant industries as a result of bankruptcy or privatisation, this 
situation has often been the origin of increasing inequalities in these societies. Consequently, the 
EU is perceived in these countries as a force which, far from being interested in their welfare, 
contributes to the perpetuation of their underdevelopment, which is beneficial to its own 
economy as well as to the local elites in these countries. 
8.4 Conditioning factors 
What explains the EU’s pursuit of non-normative goals through its trade policy despite the 
normative means at its disposal?  
Internal interests 
The EU’s myopic pursuit of possession goals in North Africa runs counter to the calls 
emanating from certain European political and civil society actors advocating the pursuit of 
normative goals such as sustainable development and respect for human rights and democratic 
values. It vindicates the view that, despite the EU’s broader normative discourse, priority in 
practice is given to the pursuit of narrower interests. This can partly be explained by the specific 
interests of several member states. Whereas the share of the Maghreb in the EU’s total trade 
remains largely insignificant (less than 3%), its relative importance for the southern member 
states (Spain, France and Italy) – the main architects of the EU’s Mediterranean policy – has 
translated into an interest on the part of these countries to reinforce the existing patterns of trade 
between them and the Maghreb countries. More specifically, the influence of business lobbies in 
the EU with vested interests in the Maghreb is an internal element that needs to be factored-in to 
account for the EU’s policy. Businesses with an economic interest in the North African market 
push for a liberalisation of trade with the region, whereas those competing with its imports 
advocate greater trade restrictions. The result is a strategy that posits the pursuit of sustainable 
development in the Maghreb as competing with the EU’s commercial interests.  
More convincingly, the EU’s preoccupation with energy security and migration in its broad 
relations with the Maghreb has raised the importance attributed to its political relations with the 
incumbent elites in these countries. This has meant that the Union has taken great care not to 
upset the commercial interests of the domestic political actors in these countries with key stakes 
in trade ties with the EU. The EU’s choice has thus been to preserve the prevailing 
configuration of its relations with the Maghreb. 
Internal capability 
The EU is able to pursue possession goals through normative means because of its framework 
of rules and institutions. The EU’s trade relations with the region have developed over the 
course of 50 years, in which through trial and error, the EU has successfully built a framework 
of interaction incorporating its normative and strategic interests. The EU’s active involvement 
and power in the formulation of the world trade regime has also meant that it has succeeded in 
legalising the pursuit of its commercial interests.   
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The external environment  
Factors external to the EU have also been important determinants of EU trade policy towards 
North Africa, contributing to an explanation of the EU’s non-normative results. These are 
internal to the region or pertaining to the policies of other international actors. Specifically, the 
EU’s status in North Africa as the main trading partner and only policy entrepreneur in this 
issue area has enabled it to set the policy agenda, leaving the North African countries to react 
and accommodate their interests to the EU-dictated framework. The relatively advanced state of 
convergence between the Moroccan and Tunisian regulatory frameworks and that of the EU, 
however, has translated into more positive outcomes for these countries’ economies as a result 
of the EU’s trade policy. The resulting relative leverage gained by these countries has allowed 
them to pursue their own possession goals more effectively than countries like Algeria, which 
has been less willing to reform in the economic realm. Internationally, the EU has recently seen 
its traditional position as the region’s main trading partner being challenged by the increasing 
presence of actors like China, Russia and the US. The policies of these international actors 
towards North Africa have been aimed exclusively at pursuing crude possession goals without 
any consideration for normative conditionality. In view of rising international competition, the 
EU is increasingly prioritising the pursuit of its own possession goals. 
9. Policies towards Ukraine, 2005-20: Status Quo Unintended 
Contributed by Michael Emerson 
9.1 Non-normative goals 
The EU’s political declarations and official documents on Ukraine are always expressed in 
highly normative language, hoping to see Ukraine become a well functioning democracy and 
European-style social-market economy, with wholesale convergence on European values and 
standards. While the EU has not been able to agree on the goal of Ukraine’s full membership 
perspective, even for the long-term, Ukraine itself, especially under President Viktor 
Yushchenko, has made this its headline political objective. After the Orange Revolution of 
2005, he even advocated membership by 2010, which Brussels told him could not even be 
discussed.  
The reasons for the EU’s refusal to offer the prospect of membership, casting in doubt the 
degree of its normative commitment to Ukraine, seem to be a mix of three arguments, both of 
which are linked to possession considerations. The first, partly couched in possession goal 
terms, is a general opposition to further EU enlargement beyond present commitments. The 
reasons for this are firstly a concern for the EU’s institutional capability to function with further 
major expansions, which may be viewed as a relatively neutral and technical reason to object. 
The second consideration however has serious implications for our study; it is that some 
existing member states, especially from the original six, give a large weight to avoiding a 
further dilution of their own power within the EU, and less weight to the normative argument 
that advocates a widening of the European space of democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law. A third reason, also non-normative in nature, is deference to Russia, as noted also in the 
Russia case study. In the early post-Soviet period, an EU policy of ‘Russia-first’ was quite 
evident. This has been diluted over time as Ukrainian independence has been confirmed, and as 
Russia has turned less democratic. Nevertheless, this ‘Russia-first’ tendency is not extinguished, 
and to the extent that this in part motivates the blocking position over Ukraine’s membership 
perspective, it amounts to confirming the non-normative quality of the EU position in the post-
Orange revolution period. 
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9.2 Normative means 
The means employed by the EU have clearly been of normative character, however, and devoid 
of forceful realpolitik. The framework for EU policy was initially the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), succeeded now by the Action Plan of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The PCA was the first text to invite Ukraine down the path of 
convergence on EU norms and standards. It identified 21 domains of policy where 
approximation of EU laws was prescribed as a priority task. The Ukrainian government, under 
Leonid Kuchma at the time, instructed its Ministry of Justice to embark on an ambitious 
programme of legislative action to this end. The ENP, beginning in 2004, was designed to 
upgrade the PCA, without however granting the still sought after membership perspective. The 
Commission drew up an Action Plan prescribing about 300 lines of political, legal and 
economic reform. Ukraine was pressured into negotiating and agreeing upon this plan, which 
was largely based on a watered-down version of the criteria for EU accession, even while 
grumbling that it was not what it wanted.   
In the middle of this negotiation came the dramatic Orange revolution of 2005. At the heart of 
the crisis the EU was invited as a mediator to its great surprise. This happened when the 
presidents of Lithuania and Poland were invited to Kiev, and they called Solana to join them, 
which he did. This incident illustrated how the new member states began to change the 
behaviour of the EU towards a more substantial concern for Ukraine’s political future. Soon 
after the Orange revolution, there were efforts by Ukraine, backed by several Eastern European 
member states, to get a better ENP Action Plan, but these yielded only token results. However 
the EU did later agree to open negotiations for a ‘deep free trade’ agreement as soon as Ukraine 
has acceded to the WTO. The ‘deep free trade’ concept, as set out in a feasibility study done for 
the Commission and government of Ukraine by CEPS, goes far in building a strong normative 
and positive governance content into a trade deal (Emerson et al., 2006a). This is through 
proposing alignment by Ukraine on the EU’s internal market laws and policies, which therefore 
goes into the reform of Ukraine’s deeply corrupted domestic governance.  
The EU has also agreed in 2006 to open negotiations for an ‘Enhanced Agreement’ to replace 
the PCA. This new treaty would have a comprehensive coverage of all EU competences and 
political criteria for membership (without conceding the membership perspective point) – for 
the political system, human rights, the rule of law, convergence on the EU market law, market 
economy, border management and migration rules, and even association with EU foreign 
policies. This proposed agreement may become a new template for the EU’s relations with its 
close neighbours, alongside various improvements to the ENP which have been under 
negotiation within the EU itself (Emerson, Noutcheva & Popescu, 2007).  
The EU also agreed to respond positively to the invitation of Ukraine and Moldova to send a 
Border Management mission to the Moldovan secessionist entity of Transnistria. This mission 
of EU border guards has the mission of controlling smuggling through the borders into both 
Ukraine and Moldova, and is a case study in itself of assistance in bringing the rule of law into 
grossly corrupted state mechanisms (extending way beyond the borders of Transnistria into the 
workings of the Ukrainian port of Odessa). 
9.3 Normative results 
Under Kuchma, Ukraine’s part in the PCA process was thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the 
EU because of the rampant corruption of the regime up to the top, its notorious habit of sending 
contradictory messages to Brussels and Moscow (or what came to be referred to as a ‘milking 
two cows at the same time’ policy), and finally to the sordid Gondgadze murder (the secret 
services taped, and later leaked, Kuchma’s conversations in which he gave instructions to get rid 
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of this inconvenient journalist). Under Kuchma there were no results at the level of governance 
of Ukraine. Yet the social pressures that triggered the Orange revolution were building up 
during those years, and Ukraine’s civil society and media freedoms had developed impressively. 
Although the Orange revolution soon faded amidst chronic divisions and disorganisation at the 
political level, Ukraine has remained a vibrant democracy, with no relapse into a strong state 
regime, refusing notably to copy the model of the Putin regime. Despite these normative results, 
Ukraine remains nonetheless fragile, with a dysfunctional democracy. Powerful oligarchs 
remain in deeply corrupted collusion with all parts of the political system. The struggle remains 
between social pressures in favour of European values versus a status quo, or between pro-
Western and pro-Russian interests. There are some tendencies on the part of the oligarchs to 
orient their priorities increasingly towards integration into the European economy.  
9.4 Conditioning factors 
The internal political context 
The divisions between EU member states over both the membership perspective and the ‘Russia 
first’ question have undermined substantially the EU’s behaviour as a would-be normative actor 
in the Ukrainian case. EU member states have been deeply divided on the question of 
membership, with Poland and Sweden leading a group that would like to offer the seemingly 
magic words ‘membership perspective’, whereas France and Belgium lead the group who are 
categorically opposed. There is a further middle group, including probably Germany and the 
UK, who take a low-profile position. But since anything to do with the EU’s enlargement 
becomes a matter requiring unanimity, this division means that the EU is by default refusing the 
membership perspective.  
Internal capability 
The EU has a comprehensive set of instruments actually or potentially at its disposal in the 
context of the ENP. This was illustrated by Romano Prodi’s remark when he was President of 
the Commission that the partner states, and Ukraine in particular, could be offered ‘everything 
but institutions’. The most ambitious conception of the ENP thus offers widespread 
participation in EU policies and approximation or simple copying of EU norms and standards, 
ranging from technical product standards to highly political questions. The EU is feeling its way 
gradually towards this model. Yet the member states that have refused the membership 
perspective are acting as a brake even on giving full throttle to an ‘everything but institutions’ 
version of the ENP. The EU’s present internal capability is thus constrained to a lower level 
than that which can be envisaged. The EU could be said to have a potential capability for a 
much stronger normative role in Ukraine. Yet against this there are powerful voices asserting 
that the EU must now define its final frontiers, since otherwise it will destroy itself, and in 
particular its reality as a community of values, by over-expanding its frontiers. This argument is 
effectively denying the EU’s potential capability in its Eastern neighbourhood.  
The external environment 
The unintended normative impact of the EU’s status quo approach towards Ukraine can instead 
mainly be attributed to Russia, which, in a diametrically opposite way than in Belarus, has 
helped strengthen the appeal of the EU’s normative model by behaving towards Ukraine in such 
a clumsily realpolitik mode. There are numerous examples of this, aside from the notorious gas 
war of January 2006. Russia has been refusing to negotiate and agree a precise demarcation of 
its frontier with Ukraine, undermining the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood. In 2004 Russia 
tried unilaterally and forcefully to change the map of the Azov Sea, building a land bridge to a 
28 | TOCCI WITH DARBOUCHE, EMERSON, FERNANDES, HANAU-SANTINI, NOUTCHEVA & PORTELA 
crucial island, until finally even Kuchma screamed hard enough to stop it. Putin then blatantly 
backed Yanukovich in the fraudulent elections that led to the Orange revolution. Russia has 
rented crowds of babushkas and Cossacks in Crimea to protest NATO activities. It has 
suggested revising the agreement for their fleet to quit Sebastopol by 2017. These actions have 
contributed positively to the consolidation of Ukrainian national unity and identity, and the 
perceived need for a European anchorage, in spite of remaining national divisions.  
10. Conclusions 
10.1 The EU as a multifaceted foreign policy actor 
The EU, as an international player, can act and has acted in a variety of different ways in world 
politics. Without excessively forcing our matrix of options, we have been able to find and fit 
one case per each of the eight possible categories. In cases such as the eastern enlargement and 
policies towards neighbouring Belarus, the EU has pursued normative goals through policy 
instruments that were crafted and deployed within the confines of the law. Yet while the EU 
succeeded in engendering democratisation and economic modernisation in Eastern Europe, its 
double-track strategy has, to date, failed to alter the nature and strength of the authoritarian 
Belarus regime. The Belarus leadership has not reacted positively to sanctions, while EU actors 
recognise that they have been unable to convey effectively their message of support to the 
Belarusian population.  
By contrast, in the case of Russia and Syria, the EU has behaved in an overall realpolitik 
manner. Vis-à-vis Russia, commercial and energy interests explain the sidetracking of EU 
political pressure on Moscow exerted through dialogue (let alone conditionality). Likewise in 
Syria, realist concerns, such as preserving the regional balance of power between Israel and its 
neighbours and following the line set by the US, have had a larger sway over EU policies than 
aims to see political transformation and a law-based agreement with Israel. In turn, the 
deployment of EU policy means has been rather inconsistent, ranging from unkept promises of 
ratifying Syria’s AA, to sporadic pressure on the regime (i.e. regarding Lebanon) without 
constant attention to Syria’s human rights record.  
In Kosovo and Israel-Palestine, the EU has behaved as an imperialistic actor. While intervening 
in the pursuit of normative goals (i.e. a two-state solution and respect for human rights in the 
Middle East; and the prevention and rectification of injustice in Kosovo), the EU has often acted 
by sidelining the law. Yet results have differed. While Kosovo remains an unfinished story, the 
likelihood is that a solution will be reached recognising independence, possibly leading to a 
revisionist setting of ‘new norms’. In the Middle East, by contrast, a viable two-state solution 
appears to be an increasingly distant chimera (Annapolis notwithstanding), while violations of 
human rights and international law persist unabated.  
Finally, the EU has acted as a status quo player in North Africa and Ukraine. In both cases, the 
Union has primarily pursued non-normative goals. In North Africa, not only has the EU 
prioritised its trade interests over the promotion of political reform, but it has done so in a 
manner beneficial to itself while detrimental to growth and modernisation of the dependent 
North African economies. In Ukraine instead, while favouring Kiev’s European orientation and 
its reform process in principle, normative EU aims have been hollowed-out by the resistance of 
several member states to grant Ukraine a European perspective, not least out of fear an eventual 
dilution of their internal power. In both cases, however, the means pursued by the EU have been 
normative. Relations have been conducted through EU contractual ties, including the AAs, the 
PCSs, and, more recently, the ENP. Given that the EU has been on the stronger side of these 
contractual ties, Brussels has ensured that the pursuit of its possession goals has been channelled 
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through clear and transparent legal rules. The results have differed however. In North Africa, 
EU involvement has not opened the way to a deep process of political and economic 
transformation, while in Ukraine, despite widespread feelings of deception from the EU and 
ongoing political instability and corruption, the post-revolution period has seen the 
consolidation of democracy.  
10.2 The dynamics at work in EU foreign policy 
But what do these cases tell us about the EU as a (normative) foreign policy actor? And more 
precisely which are the factors determining how and why the EU acts in specific ways in 
different cases? By taking our eight cases studies together, several broad lessons can be brought 
to the fore.  
Beginning with the goals pursued, we can contrast the normative and imperialistic cases, in 
which the EU opts for normative goals, with the realpolitik and the status quo cases, in which 
non-normative objectives prevail. Analysing the conditioning factors in these cases, it emerges 
that in the former two either milieu and possession goals overlap or there are no strong and 
contradictory possession goals working against the pursuit of norms. Whereas in the case of 
Belarus, the EU is able to pursue its (limited) trade interests alongside its democracy-driven 
sanctions, in the case of Eastern Europe, once the member states converged on the idea of 
‘reuniting Europe’, they could not afford to accept blatant violations of norms, in so far as these 
could ultimately threaten the EU from within. In this respect, enlargement policy can be seen as 
a special case precisely because it is not, strictu senso, foreign policy. Likewise in the two 
imperialistic cases, after decades (in the Middle East) or years (in Kosovo) of standstill, the 
member states converged at the level of rhetoric, to pursue normative objectives consisting in a 
rights-based, two-state solution in both Israel-Palestine and Serbia-Kosovo. In both cases, 
discursively agreeing on normative goals has been the least controversial and divisive option for 
the EU. In the realpolitik and status quo cases, instead, the configuration of internal interests 
and intra-EU divisions has been far more pronounced, leading to a prioritisation of possession 
goals. On the one hand, strong and competing possession goals such as energy (Russia), the 
balance of power in the Middle East and transatlantic cooperation (Syria), commercial interests, 
the migration management (North Africa), and member state preservation of their internal 
power (Ukraine) have trumped competing normative objectives. On the other hand, the primary 
concern of several member states to pursue their disjointed self-interests at the expense of EU-
wide objectives and member state ability in EU foreign policy to veto collective action explains 
the prioritisation of possession goals in these cases.  
Turning to the means, here normative behaviour can be found in the normative and the status 
quo case studies, in contrast to the realpolitik and imperialistic cases, in which the EU has acted 
in contravention of or sidelined law and multilateral institutions. The primary, albeit not only, 
explanation of why this has been the case seems to lie in the EU’s internal capability, although 
in a manner that partly contradicts the intuitive consensus about EU foreign policy. The problem 
in fact does not seem to lie in the EU’s insufficient capabilities, particularly in the military 
domain. Normative means tend to be deployed when the EU chooses to act within the confines 
of its contractual relations with third states and has no or limited coercive instruments at its 
disposal. Indeed, normative means have been deployed in cases where the primary vehicles of 
EU policy have been contractual relations, whether the accession process (Eastern Europe), the 
association process (North Africa), the Partnership and Cooperation process (Belarus) or the 
ENP (Ukraine). By contrast, whereas the EU has disposed of contractual options in the 
realpolitik and imperialistic cases, it has either chosen not to make use of these instruments 
(Syria) or it has pursued its objectives beyond the blueprint and stated aims of these contracts 
(Russia, Kosovo and Israel-Palestine). Of course, in some cases, the EU has been strongly 
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pressed by external actors and factors to sideline rules and law. In the Middle East, the US has 
induced the Union to either avoid concluding a contractual agreement (Syria) or set aside or to 
violate the norms, rules and laws embedded in these agreements (Israel-Palestine). In the other 
cases, Russia’s new assertiveness has either obstructed international legal channels (Kosovo) or 
cornered the Union into sidelining the human rights and democracy standards spelt out in its 
bilateral agreements with Moscow.   
Yet while important in defining or constraining foreign policy means, the external environment 
is critical in influencing above all the EU’s foreign policy impact. Naturally, what the EU does 
is the primary determinant of its impact. Hence, it is far more likely that the Union will have a 
normative impact when it pursues normative goals and means (Eastern Europe) than when it 
acts in an imperialistic, realpolitik or status quo way. But on the one hand, the Belarus case 
exemplifies that this is not always the case, while on the other hand the cases of Syria, Ukraine 
and Kosovo suggest that the EU can have a normative impact even when either its goals or 
policy means are not normative.  
Especially in these non-intuitive cases, the role of the external environment is of the essence. A 
conducive external context is of primary importance for an effective normative impact. In Syria, 
Damascus’ isolation by the West and its many internal weaknesses explain in part why, to some 
extent, the Ba’ath regime has abided by international norms. Furthermore, the EU is Syria’s first 
trading partner and is viewed as a less aggressive actor than the US. Hence, against all odds, 
Damascus strives to keep a door open to Brussels. In Kosovo, despite Russian resistance, the 
West has the power to assert the end-game even if in contravention of international law. In 
Ukraine, paradoxically it is the nearby influence of Moscow that has induced pro-reform actors 
in Kiev to latch on to the EU irrespective of what the Union says and does. In the case of 
Eastern Europe instead, to bolster the effectiveness of normative EU goals and means has been 
these countries’ welcoming of the EU’s involvement coupled with the complementary support 
of other international actors, e.g. the US and the international financial institutions (IFIs). 
By contrast, however, an unfavourable external environment, coupled with EU weakness vis-à-
vis third states or the wider milieu, reduces the likelihood of a normative impact. In Belarus, in 
the absence of free media, the Belarus leadership has divulgated its own vision of reality, 
hardened its stance and instumentalised Western pressure to induce a ‘rally around the flag’ 
effect. Belarus’ relatively stable economic situation and its geopolitical anchorage to Russia 
have also made the country less dependent upon Europe. In Russia, the discovery of energy 
leverage and an accompanying political assertiveness on the international scene have 
contributed to undermining the effectiveness of the EU’s normative message and allowed 
Moscow to play member state interests against each other. In the Middle East, the EU’s 
acceptance of playing second fiddle to the US, its preoccupation of maintaining close ties with 
Israel and the hold that Israel itself has on the EU have all induced the Union to strive for a 
modicum of stability in the region short of seeking peace and respecting rights. Finally in North 
Africa, whereas the EU has sufficiently strong bargaining power vis-à-vis these countries, the 
resilience of these regimes has reduced the prospect that the EU’s (secondary) normative goals 
will have a discernible impact on the ground.  
10.3 Transforming the EU into a normative power in the world 
The discussion on means and impact points to a conundrum. On the one hand, the EU is more 
likely to pursue normative means when power relations between the EU and a third state are 
relatively balanced and relations develop within the confines of mutually negotiated agreements. 
On the other hand, power and particularly relational power seems to be of critical importance to 
engendering a normative impact given that even the best of intentions may be an insufficient 
condition of success (Belarus). How can the EU escape this conundrum and maximise its 
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chances of acting as a ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002), as it repeatedly proclaims is its role 
in the world?  
In so far as the EU and its member states do not live, at least not always, on Kagan’s Venus 
(Kagan, 2003), but rather are also driven by possession goals just like any other international 
actor, there is little point in naively asserting that the EU should sideline its possession goals in 
the name of its proclaimed milieu norms. Desirable as it may be, simply calling for this to 
happen will not change the dynamics at work. Neither can the EU single-handedly affect the 
external environment in which its foreign policies unfold. While it can certainly influence the 
external context, particularly in its neighbourhood where it has real foreign policy presence, it is 
bound to also rely on fortuitous external circumstances to effectively assert its normative power.    
One suggestion is to improve the EU’s internal capabilities. This would not necessarily mean 
strengthening capabilities in the classic sense of the term such as for example acquiring greater 
economic leverage or building military means. Strengthening capabilities in these terms could, 
by contrast, damage the EU’s normative role by generating internal EU incentives to bend the 
law in order to pursue foreign policy goals in the interests of the EU or its member states. 
Instead, the Union could strengthen its web of contractual relations with third states in a manner 
that would ‘tie its own hands’, thus reducing its ability to act non-normatively. This would 
entail developing further the set of rules and laws that bind EU external behaviour in relation to 
third states, and link these rules and norms explicitly to the obligations set under international 
law. It would also entail establishing or strengthening the EU’s internal institutional watchdog 
mechanisms, ensuring that when one EU actor behaves or is tempted to behave in contravention 
of set rules, others are ready and able to prevent this from happening. Understanding the 
importance of working in this direction is predicated upon an appreciation that the EU is not 
necessarily normative and that its internal actors are often driven by the very same set of 
interests and priorities that motivate other international actors. A shift in this direction would 
also substantiate claims that the EU’s sui generis nature reflects a truly novel identity as a 
normative actor in world politics.  
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European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.
